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Abstract 
Natural disasters cause suffering for millions of people around the globe every year and as 
climate change unfolds the likelihood of natural catastrophes is increasing. While weather 
shocks, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods are beyond our control, a governments’ 
capacity to protect populations largely determines the degree of human suffering in disasters. 
Democracies, with freedom of speech, broad public participation and representation, are 
believed to protect their populations better than non-democratic regimes. However, democratic 
institutions are insufficient for securing protection from disasters in contexts of corruption, poor 
planning and public administration incompetence. We argue that the effect of democracy on the 
extent of human suffering in disasters is contingent on the ability of governments to implement 
their tasks or the quality of implementing institutions. We test this interaction hypothesis using 
time series cross-sectional data from the Varieties of Democracy project, the Quality of 
Government dataset and data from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. 
The results show that more democracy is associated with fewer people being affected by natural 
disasters only in settings where institutional quality is high. When institutional quality is low, 
more people seem to suffer in democracies than in authoritarian states. 
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Introduction 
Natural disasters affect millions of people around the world every year. While governments 
cannot prevent earthquakes or tornadoes from happening, it is in governments’ power to adopt 
and implement policies that can reduce the devastating consequences from natural disasters for 
the people. Yet, the extent of human suffering differs substantially and systematically between 
countries, indicating a great variation in how well countries are prepared to protect the 
population when an adverse weather event strikes. The aim of this paper is to explore the 
sources of this variation. 
Coping with natural disasters is one of the key functions of the state as a part of its task to 
provide security to its citizens. This involves extensive provision of public goods, such as early 
warning systems, shelters, roads, healthcare centers and other necessary infrastructure designed 
to ensure the safety of the population in an emergency situation. Two sets of political processes 
stand out as particularly important in determining the extent of public goods provision: 
processes shaping how people’s demand for public policies is articulated, that is regime type, and 
processes shaping the supply of public goods, that is quality of public policy implementation. 
Democratic institutions, through which state leaders are held accountable to their constituents, 
are believed to create more incentives for leaders to deliver public goods and ensure security for 
the population than institutions in authoritarian regimes (Schmitter and Karl 1991; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2005). There is a lot of variation, however, in how democracies perform. Just as 
with authoritarian states, they can also be dominated by special interests and distribute 
protection unequally; they can be inefficient and corrupt, which can hamper long-term policy 
undertakings, such as building up a country’s readiness to cope with exogenous shocks (Bueno 
de Mesquita 2003; Diamond 2007). Therefore, governments’ ability to implement vulnerability 
reduction policies and their capacity to deliver public goods and services to all entitled recipients 
is also crucial for developing disaster preparedness.  
Both democracy, which helps bring people’s demands for disaster prevention onto the 
political agenda, and state capacity, which is necessary to supply public goods and fulfill those 
demands, are widely acknowledged in the literature on disaster prevention as political sources of 
disasters (Wisner et al. 2004; Keefer et al. 2011; Kahn 2005; Lewis 2011). We move the previous 
arguments forward and stress that neither of the factors is sufficient for minimizing the count of 
people affected by natural disasters. We claim that the effects of democracy and the quality of 
implementing institutions on public goods provision – as demand and supply parts of the 
political system – are dependent on one another and interact in the production of vulnerability. 
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Preparation for emergency situations, such as natural disasters, requires dealing with the 
uncertainty of the future and long-term planning, which is only possible in those political 
systems where politicians are committed to serve the long-term interests of the people. Without 
facing the immediate consequences of their actions, short-sighted politicians have an incentive to 
underinvest in such long-term commitments as disaster prevention and undersupply public 
goods. The necessity of long-term planning and forward thinking makes disaster preparation a 
good test of how well the state works for its citizens. 
We test our hypothesis on the interaction between democracy and institutional quality 
empirically on the global sample using data from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters, the Variety of Democracy project and the Quality of Government dataset. The 
findings reveal that the effect of democracy on disaster outcomes is contingent on the 
institutional quality that shapes the implementation of public policy programs, while the level of 
equality in a democracy in turn moderates the effect of institutional quality on the number of 
people affected by disasters.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the existing 
theories on the political roots of vulnerability and introduces the study’s theoretical model. After 
this, we introduce the data and method of the study. The results section describes the main 
findings of the paper, while the final section offers conclusions.  
 
I. Theoretical background 
To avoid conceptual confusion, we, first and foremost, distinguish the concepts of natural 
hazards, natural disasters and vulnerability. When severe and extreme weather events, such as 
earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and droughts affect people’s livelihood, they become 
natural disasters (WMO 2015). Outside of their relationship to humans, these hazardous events 
can be simply seen as nature merely taking its course (O'Keefe et al. 1976). Proneness to 
suffering the severe consequences of natural hazards depends on vulnerability, a set of 
conditions that influences people’s capacity to “anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the 
impact of a natural hazard” (Wisner et al. 2004, 11). The key to reducing vulnerability is 
preparation for hazardous weather events and disaster prevention rather than mitigation of the 
consequences of disasters. As the effects of adverse weather events unfold quickly, the most 
effective way to minimize damage is to be ready for them. Well-functioning early warning 
systems that can for example stop railways and plants, open emergency exits, and trigger alarms; 
the presence of roads with clearly marked routes that can facilitate and speed up evacuation, the 
	 6	
availability of shelters, and the prevalence of strong structures made of robust building materials 
can be lifesaving (Schulz 2015). While specific conditions, such as the number of storm shelters 
or the existence of regulations concerning the robustness of buildings, are specific outcomes of 
political decisions, the roots of vulnerability lie in the political and economic processes that 
shape governments’ decisions to invest in disaster prevention and their ability to implement 
disaster prevention programs (Wisner et al. 2004; Brooks et al. 2005). In this paper we focus on 
these root causes of vulnerability, as these should be the primary targets in the process of 
vulnerability reduction.  
 
Disaster prevention as a public good 
Ensuring public safety and security from natural disasters involves the provision of public goods, 
including the mapping of hazard areas, construction of preventive measures, such as dykes or 
levies, establishment and maintenance of early warning systems, reliable public infrastructure, 
evacuation roads, health centers and shelters (Raschky 2008, 630; Schulz 2015).  
Pure public goods are non-excludable in consumption and are non-rivalrous (Ostrom and 
Ostrom 1977). However, access to public goods can be restricted to certain groups in polities 
with high levels of inequality or where favoritism is common. Healthcare centers, roads and 
shelters may be built in some regions but not in others; they may be available to some groups of 
citizens and not others. Information on the impending natural hazard can be made available only 
in those regions that have the infrastructure necessary for receiving such information.   
Where a national government has its power base in a few cities, it may try to 
reinforce its support following a disaster by spending a good deal on improved 
housing in those cities, while such allocation of resources actually increases the 
vulnerability to hazards of the rural dwellers. Thus, locational decisions by the 
state bureaucracy redistribute vulnerability in society (Wisner and Luce 1993, 
134). 
 
Democracy and natural disasters 
Democratic institutions help the public articulate its demand for public goods, while elections in 
democracies provide citizens with the power to replace political leaders that do not fulfill their 
expectations, thereby creating incentives for political leaders to deliver. In order for political 
commitment aimed at disaster prevention to appear, people have to recognize disaster as a 
political scandal, and politicians who fail to adopt the necessary disaster preventive measures 
should face the possibility of lower popular support in the next elections, thus diminishing their 
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chances of getting reelected (De Waal 1997). Relying on larger groups for support than 
authoritarian leaders, democratically elected governments are also believed to provide more 
public goods and to larger populations than autocrats (Deacon 2009; Bueno de Mesquita 2003; 
Lake and Baum 2001).  
An essential condition for the public to hold politicians accountable through elections is 
free and full access to information, which is an attribute of democracy, and which allows the 
public to assess the government’s actions. Freedom of expression and association give civil 
society organizations the opportunity to mobilize and put pressure on leaders who fail to 
organize effective disaster prevention and planning or to unite in adaptation efforts to prevent 
potential disasters themselves (Congleton 2006; Aldrich and Crook 2008). Freedom of speech 
also ensures the existence of credible information, to which governments can respond, while 
necessary warning information can help individuals make more risk-aware decisions when a 
hazard event strikes (Raschky 2008). Amartya Sen (1990), who initiated influential research on 
the capacity of governments to prevent famines and other disasters, underscored the benefits of 
democratic regimes:  
The diverse political freedoms that are available in a democratic state, 
including regular elections, free newspapers and freedom of speech, must 
be seen as the real force behind the elimination of famines. Here again, it 
appears that one set of freedoms – to criticize, publish and vote – are 
usually linked with other types of freedoms, such as the freedom to escape 
starvation and famine mortality  
However, democracies, just like authoritarian regimes, can be rather unequal, with partisan 
politics in play. Parties may often tailor policies to reward their supporters, privileging certain 
groups in the distribution of amenities, while the size of constituencies determines whether these 
rewards favor inequalities or diminish them (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). Selective provision of 
public goods leaves certain groups of the population, divided by age, gender, class, religion or 
ethnicity, underprivileged and with limited access to power, structures and resources. 
Marginalization of groups increases social inequalities in the degree of exposure to disaster risk 
and makes vulnerability unequally distributed across society. Such unequal distribution can be 
reflected in the density of infrastructure available for populations, for example the number of 
shelters and emergency centers provided (Cutter et al. 2003; Wisner and Luce 1993). Equal civil 
liberties, such as freedom of association and expression and equal political participation and 
representation in decision-making bodies, increase the influence of different social groups over 
policymaking and policy implementation and therefore increase the likelihood that public goods 
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will be universally supplied (Isham et al. 1997; Lindberg et al. 2014, 160).  
Numerous empirical findings have shown that democracy is indeed associated with lower 
numbers of people being affected by disasters. Kahn (2005) reports significantly higher death 
tolls in less democratic countries. Keefer et al. (2011), investigating how earthquake propensity 
results in different mortality rates arising from earthquakes in different regimes, find that 
democracies are on average better prepared for earthquakes than authoritarian states. Cohen and 
Werker (2008) conclude that the responsiveness of governments to populations and the absence 
of intrastate conflict are prerequisites for creating effective policies for disaster preparedness. 
Inequality and the absence of power sharing are also emphasized in numerous case studies as 
sources of vulnerability to natural hazards (Allen 2006; Mustafa 1998; Pelling 1998; Nakagawa 
and Shaw 2004; Trench et al. 2007). 
 In sum, previous research has suggested that democracy incorporates mechanisms that 
can increase disaster preparedness. However, as many cases show, democratic processes do not 
ensure effective disaster prevention (see e.g. Congleton 2006; Lewis 2008; Dyson and Elliott 
2010). While democracy can be a powerful and robust tool in the creation of measures against 
natural disasters, “being robust is not the same thing as being effective or efficient” (Congleton 
2006, 21). Free media, political participation and representation are important for accountability 
and broadening the outreach in protection, but they are not sufficient for actually delivering 
political promises to people in low institutional quality settings, i.e. where there is a prevalence of 
corruption, poor planning and incompetence of public administration.  
 
Institutional quality and natural disasters 
The quality of public administration and institutions shaping implementation of public policies 
determines governments’ capacity to perform their tasks and supply public goods (Bäck and 
Hadenius 2008; Skocpol 1985). Bureaucratic or administrative capacity, prevalence of corruption 
and general obedience to laws, all affect the implementation of public policies, and therefore to a 
large extent determine the success or failure of implementation of disaster prevention programs 
(Skocpol 1985; Evans 1995). 
Poor institutional quality may directly result in ineffective distribution of public funds and 
lack of protective measures (Athey and Stern 2000; Raschky 2008, 630). Inefficient 
administrations with low bureaucratic capacity create few incentives for bureaucrats to actually 
implement laws and governmental decisions, leading to incompetence, poor planning and error 
(Huber and McCarty 2004). Corrupt bureaucrats and politicians can appropriate public funds 
directed for public goods provision, which eventually results in poorly functioning infrastructure, 
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bad roads, lack of warning systems, and insufficient quality of shelter and healthcare support 
(Lewis 2011). Corruption can interfere in the enforcement of building codes in the construction 
of houses, creating opportunities for underinvestment into stronger and more durable materials 
(Kahn 2005; Lewis 2008).  
Empirical research on the effect of political institutions on disaster prevention is 
dominated by case studies, while large-N generalizable analyses are scant. Raschky (2008) finds 
that higher government stability, which he uses as a proxy for governments’ ability to remain in 
office and carry out its declared programs, and better investment climate, which is a measure for 
property rights, decrease human and economic damage from disaster. Findings by Kahn (2005) 
also suggest that higher rule of law, government effectiveness and control of corruption are 
associated with fewer human fatalities as a result of a disaster. Keefer et al. (2011) show that 
non-corrupt systems are better prepared to deal with the consequences of earthquakes than 
corrupt regimes. 
 
Democracy, institutional quality and natural disasters 
Thus the literature on the political sources of disasters revolves around two main sets of political 
processes: those that shape how the demand for public goods and disaster prevention is 
articulated and those that shape the supply of public goods to the population, in particular, the 
implementation of disaster prevention programs. While democratic processes help bring the 
demands and preferences of the public onto the political agenda, quality of government, 
encompassing well-functioning bureaucracy and lack of corruption in the public sector, ensure 
the supply and delivery of public goods.  
The theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of disasters and disaster 
preparedness shows that both democracy and institutional quality are important in determining 
the vulnerability of countries to natural disasters. We move the previous arguments forward and 
claim that democracy and institutional quality, as two indispensable parts of a political system, 
cannot be considered separately when talking about the provision of public goods (Povitkina 
2015). While the level of democracy shapes how decision-making is done in a polity and to some 
extent determines how broad the circle of interests represented in the government is, 
institutional quality determines whether the decisions actually get implemented and reach the 
public. Democracy and institutional quality can thus be considered complementary to each other 
in their effect on public goods provision. Previous studies have also hypothesized that state 
capacity can substitute for the lack of democracy and is particularly important for public goods 
provision in authoritarian regimes (Hanson 2015; Knutsen 2013).   
	 10	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Democracy, institutional quality and natural disaster outcomes1  
 
 
Illustrating interaction through case examples 
Findings from numerous case studies exemplify the mechanisms through which the interactive 
relationship unfolds. A free media – which is an attribute of a democratic regime – paying strong 
attention to events both during and after the disaster, can emphasize public policy failures, stir 
severe public unrest and turn disaster into a political scandal, as happened during Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans in the U.S.A.2 and a series of disasters in Turkey in the 1990s. In New 
Orleans, numerous press conferences, organized to hold politicians accountable, revealed a lack 
of communication between different levels of government and the absence of local preparedness 
for emergencies. In Turkey, media criticism of the “inefficient”, “incompetent” and 
“inexperienced” emergency planning of the government raised public awareness about poor 
disaster preparedness and helped increase efficiency of disaster response after the Bingol 
earthquake in 2003 (Mitchell and Page 2005, 27). The attention, however, came after the disaster 
occurred and the emergency response had failed, and only improved preparedness for future 
adverse events.  
In an authoritarian state, media voices can be suppressed to avoid criticism of government 
actions during the disaster; criticism which could undermine regime legitimacy. Moreover, the 
media can be used to present government performance in a favorable light or blame exogenous 
shocks rather than poor planning. In the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, in which 
thousands of children lost their lives due to the unreliable construction of school buildings, the 
																																																						
1 We acknowledge that institutional quality and democracy level are also related, which can be depicted by arrows 
between the respective boxes on Figure 1, and which would imply mediation. However, the relationship between 
the two is not the main focus of the study and we do not explore the mediation effect, instead focusing on the 
moderation effects of both. 
2 According to our data, the US is a democracy with high institutional quality, however, as the example of Hurricane 
Katrina illustrates, there can be a lot of variation in the extent of human suffering within countries as well. To 
explore subnational variation, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Democracy 
Institutional 
quality 
Natural disaster 
outcomes 
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Chinese government was portrayed as “responsible, empathetic, effective, and oriented toward 
the public” (Landry and Stockmann 2009, 12). Reporting focused primarily on government 
rescue operations, presenting Chinese military and high-ranking officials as heroes, leaving poor 
planning and lack of enforcement of building codes hidden from public attention.   
While in authoritarian states such as China, the government can engage in mitigation 
efforts to safeguard their legitimacy and cover poor planning, in cases like Haiti, the myopic 
behavior of corrupt leaders both led to disastrous consequences and prevented the effective 
response. When the country was hit by a powerful earthquake, disaster was difficult to avoid due 
to nonexistence of sound building codes and proper inspections, the absence of the necessary 
warnings and evacuation calls immediately after the earthquake, and the general lack of 
preparation for emergencies (Fierro and Perry 2010).  
While democracy mechanisms, such as a free media that is able to criticize the 
government’s actions and an engaged civil society that can help people mobilization when 
hazardous weather events strike, undoubtedly help to lower the number of disaster victims, low 
quality of public administration diminishes the positive effect of these factors on disaster 
preparedness. Poor planning, incompetence and inefficient response, as in the case of Katrina, 
and severe corruption in the construction sector, which lead to unreliable building structures, as 
in the case of Turkey, counterbalance the positive effects that democratic processes can have on 
disaster preparedness.  
As numerous case studies show, democracy is not sufficient for disaster prevention and 
can still result in many casualties. High institutional quality is not expected to be a sufficient 
condition either, as in authoritarian states, even if infrastructure is present, it can be available to 
only some groups within the society, leaving other groups marginalized with little or no access to 
public goods (Deacon 2009). In either case the state is not expected to have a high enough level 
of preparedness to protect populations, as both aspects are crucial for reducing vulnerability.  
 
Following the discussion, our hypotheses to test are: 
 
H1: The effect of democracy on disaster outcomes is contingent on institutional quality. 
H2: The effect of institutional quality on disaster outcomes is contingent on the level of democracy.  
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II. Method 
To test our hypotheses and explore how the interplay between democracy levels and institutional 
quality affects the total number of people who suffer the consequences of natural disasters, we 
use the within-between estimation technique recently developed by Bell and Jones (2015) and 
based on earlier suggestions by Bartels (2008), Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2005) and Mundlak (1978). 
The within-between model recognizes the hierarchical structure of the data and simultaneously 
accounts for variation between the countries and developments over time within states. The 
model allows for the use of random effects by addressing the issue of correlated errors between 
the two levels of estimation (cross country and over time) through mean centering of time-
varying variables and simultaneous inclusion of their country means. Following the Bell and 
Jones (2015) guidelines, we calculate deviations from the country means for each independent 
variable and use them instead of the raw values together with the country means. The model can 
be summarized in the following equation: 𝑦!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑥!" − 𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝛽!𝑧! + (𝑢! + 𝑒!")  (1) 
where i stands for country, and t – for year; 𝛽! is an intercept, x is a vector of independent time-
varying variables, while z  is a vector of time-invariant variables; u is an error of the between 
equation, while e is an error in the within-equation. 
 
III. Data 
In measuring our dependent variable, we rely on the data from the International Disaster 
Database, gathered by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (Guha-Sapir et 
al. 2016). The database is compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, non-
governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. We use 
the information on the total number of people affected by natural disasters per year and weight 
it by the number of disasters registered within the countries for that year. This allows us to build 
a measure of the average number of people that get affected per disaster in each country.  For an 
event to be coded as a natural disaster by EM-DAT, it has to meet at least one of the following 
criteria: 1) 10 or more people are reported killed, 2) 100 or more people are reported affected, 3) 
declaration of a state of emergency, 4) call for international assistance. People are treated by the 
database as “affected” if they required urgent help during the emergency period, for example, 
needed food, water, shelter, sanitation or medical assistance. The data are positively skewed as 
there are (fortunately) substantially more cases where fewer people suffered the consequences of 
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disasters than there are cases with extensive damage. To improve model fit and distribution of 
residuals we log-transform the variable.3  
Our measure of institutional quality is an aggregated Quality of Government (QoG) Index 
taken from the International Country Risk Guide, which consists of three indicators: corruption, 
law and order and bureaucracy quality (ICRG 2014). The corruption indicator measures the 
prevalence of corruption within polities in different forms, including patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, tit-for-tat exchanges, unofficial party funding and close connections between 
politics and business. The indicator on law and order measures the strength and capabilities of 
the legal system, as well as public obedience with the law. The measure of bureaucratic quality is 
a proxy for the capacity of a bureaucracy to perform its tasks independently from political 
influence, and also taps into the issues of meritocratic employment of bureaucrats. We use an 
aggregate index to measure institutional quality because we believe all composite parts matter in 
disaster preparedness and can disrupt the positive effect of democracy. The original index varies 
from 0 to 1, where higher values stand for higher institutional quality. We rescale the index to 
take values from 0 to 10 for easier interpretation.  
We incorporate the discussion on detrimental effects of inequality for disaster outcomes in 
democracies into our hypothesis and measure democracy using the egalitarian democracy index, 
taken from the Varieties of Democracy project4 (Coppedge et al. 2016b; Sigman and Lindberg 
2015). First, the index accounts for the level of electoral democracy in a country, capturing 
freedom of association and expression, the extent to which elections in countries are free and 
fair, whether suffrage is universal and whether the executive is elected through popular elections 
or through popularly elected legislature.  However, additionally to the minimal components of 
democracy, the index reflects the distribution of social benefits and power across different social 
groups, defined by class, sex, religion and ethnicity. It accounts for power distribution according 
to socioeconomic position, social group and gender within countries, equal access to education 
and health, share of budget allocated to public/common goods as opposed to particularistic 
distribution, the share of welfare programs that provide universal rather than means-tested 
benefits, respect for civil liberties across social classes, social groups and across the territory as 
well as the extent to which citizens have equal access to justice (Sigman and Lindberg 2015). 
Thus the egalitarian democracy index captures a “thick” rather than “thin” definition of 
																																																						
3 After reducing our sample to the years for which all data on the independent variables are available, our dependent 
variable did not contain any zero observations; therefore only cases when people did suffer the consequences of 
disasters are included.  
4 Varieties of Democracy is an international research collaboration with institutional homes at the Varieties of 
Democracy Institute at the University of Gothenburg and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the 
University of Notre Dame. The Principal Investigators are Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, 
and Svend-Erik Skaaning.  
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democracy and better reflects democratic processes as a demand-side of the political system. The 
index varies from 0 to 1, with higher values corresponding to higher levels of democracy and 
egalitarianism. We rescale the index to take values from 0 to 10. 
By choosing egalitarian aspect of democracy as our main independent variable, we take 
into account inequalities within the society and can avoid using GINI coefficient and ethnic 
fractionalization, which are usually used as control variables. The Varieties of Democracy data 
have an advantage over other existing measures of democracy due to the transparent aggregation 
and data collection processes. The data coding involved 2500 country experts, who provided 
estimates of regime characteristics for each country-year (Pemstein et al. 2015).5 
Our main control variables include gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, measured in 
constant 2005 US dollars (Heston et al. 2012), population size, taken from the Maddison project 
(Bolt and van Zanden 2013), population density, collected from the World Bank Development 
indicators (WB 2014) and number of disasters happening in a country per year. Richer countries 
are expected to have more resources to build the necessary infrastructure; in countries with 
larger populations, more people are expected to suffer the consequences from a disaster, while 
densely living populations are expected to be more vulnerable (Donner and Rodríguez 2008). 
We control for the number of disasters per year to account for the frequency of disasters 
occurring in a country. Countries that are constantly hit by disasters may not have enough time 
to recover and prepare before the next hazardous event. Another argument brought up and 
tested in the literature, however, is that countries that have higher disaster propensity will put 
more effort into preparing for a disaster and therefore will suffer less in general (Keefer et al. 
2011; Neumayer et al. 2014). Including disaster occurrence also accounts for any effects that 
geography can have on the number of adverse weather events, and therefore in the between-part 
of the equation we do not add any more geographical control variables.6 In the within-part of 
the equation we include the year fixed effects to control for the effect of the disasters that hit a 
number of countries simultaneously.  
The models have successfully passed the standard regression diagnostics: residuals on both 
levels of analysis are normally distributed in the final models, no strong multicollinearity is 
																																																						
5 The problem with the Varieties of Democracy data is that it is not available for many well-performing 
authoritarian cases, such as Singapore, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, which are informative to include into the sample 
for comparison. We, nevertheless, perform robustness checks also using the Freedom House/Polity IV democracy 
indicator developed by Hadenius and Teorell (2005), which provides the estimates of democracy for these countries. 
No measures of egalitarianism, however, are available for those states; therefore we cannot compare models with 
and without these countries included.  
6 In the additional runs we checked for the effect of country’s land area, country’s geographical position using the 
measure of latitude, and additionally included a dummy variable for Small Island Developing States, a group of low-
lying coastal countries that are recognized to be particularly vulnerable. However, after the inclusion of the disaster 
frequencies, their effects are insignificant and therefore we do not include them into the final model.  
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detected in the models without interaction effects and no extreme outliers seem to affect out 
results after we make all data transformations reported in the Data section. Summary statistics 
and correlation between all the variables are reported in Appendix A.  
 
IV. Results 
The scatterplot on Figure 27 illustrates a bivariate relationship between institutional quality and 
the total number of people affected per disaster. The graph on the left shows simple linear 
prediction, which explains 27% of the variation in the dependent variable between the countries. 
In the graph on the right, we divided the sample of countries into those that score higher than 
the average8 on the egalitarian democracy index and those that score lower, and plotted separate 
predicted lines for each of the groups. Institutional quality seems to be associated with lower 
number of people suffering the consequences of disasters only in countries scoring above the 
average on the Egalitarian democracy index (marked in black). In authoritarian states and 
democracies with undeveloped egalitarian values (marked grey), there does not seem to be a 
difference between countries with relatively higher and relatively lower institutional quality.  
Figure 2. Quality of Government and the number of people affected in disasters 
 
Similarly, Figure 3 presents a bivariate scatterplot between egalitarian democracy and the 
number of people affected per disaster. The graph on the left is a linear prediction and it 
explains 31% of the variation in the dependent variable between the countries, as indicated by 
the R2. In the graph on the right, we divided the sample into countries that score above the 
																																																						
7 Figure 2 is built on the average values of the variables across the time periods available per country.  
8 The average on Egalitarian Democracy in our sample is 4.5 on a 0-10 scale, which is about the level of Moldova. 
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average on the Quality of Government Index9 (in black) and countries that have scores below 
the average (in grey). The pattern is similar to the one in Figure 2: higher democracy seems to be 
associated with lower number of people suffering the consequences of disasters only when 
institutional quality is high. When institutional quality is low, democracy does not seem to be 
associated with the number of disaster victims.  
Figure 3. Egalitarian Democracy and the number of people affected in disasters 
 
We proceed to explore these patterns further by formally testing the interactive 
relationship and adding the selected control variables to account for other factors that have 
shown to be important in predicting the amount of people getting affected by disasters in the 
previous research.  
Table 1 presents the results of Equation (1).10 The between and within-parts of the 
equation are separated into different sections within the table. Between-estimation is based on 
the analysis of the variance between the countries, while within-estimation uses the over-time 
variance within the states. Models 1 and 2 show that higher institutional quality and higher 
democracy are associated with fewer people suffering the consequences of natural disasters and 
the effects are rather large. Technically, moving one unit on the democracy scale is associated 
with a 56.5%11 decrease in the number of people affected. Similarly, a one unit increase in 
institutional quality is associated with a 67.5%12 decrease in the number of people affected.  
																																																						
9 The average on Quality of Government in our sample is 5.35 on a 0-10 scale, which is the level of Turkey. 
10 We include both within- and between- part in the same table, despite the fact that the results in the within-part are 
insignificant, because they are a part of the same equation and cannot be separated.  
11 100(e0.448-1)=100(1.5652-1)=56.5 
12 100(e0.516-1)=100(1.6753-1)=67.5 
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Table 1. The effect of egalitarian democracy and quality of government on the number of 
people affected per disaster 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Between-part 
 
    Egalitarian democracy -0.448*** 
 
-0.135+ 0.471** 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.080) (0.157) 
QoG 
 
-0.516*** -0.008 0.578** 
  
(0.069) (0.104) (0.202) 
Egal.Democracy*QoG 
   
-0.106*** 
    
(0.027) 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
-0.721*** -0.751*** 
   
(0.154) (0.143) 
Population density (log) 
  
-0.084 -0.089 
   
(0.098) (0.088) 
Population size (log) 
  
0.078 0.110 
   
(0.110) (0.104) 
Frequency of disasters 
  
1.554*** 1.523*** 
   
(0.301) (0.284) 
Within-part 
         
Egalitarian democracy 0.051 
 
0.045 0.045 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.093) (0.095) 
QoG 
 
0.095 0.069 0.043 
  
(0.061) (0.069) (0.074) 
Egal.Democracy*QoG 
   
-0.063 
    
(0.090) 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
-0.352 -0.355 
   
(0.252) (0.252) 
Population density (log) 
  
1.495 1.555 
   
(1.183) (1.184) 
Population size (log) 
  
-0.264 -0.297 
   
(1.108) (1.111) 
Frequency of disasters 
  
0.305** 0.298** 
   
(0.110) (0.109) 
Constant 10.723*** 11.485*** 14.413*** 11.554*** 
 
(0.343) (0.414) (1.521) (1.659) 
     Observations 1,958 1,958 1,958 1,958 
Number of countries 125 125 125 125 
R2 between 0.310 0.270 0.571 0.608 
R2 within 0.000 0.001 0.045 0.046 
R2 overall 0.107 0.076 0.286 0.314 
Year FE no no yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. DV: Average number of people affected per disaster per country per year.  
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The significant interaction term in Model 4, however, implies that the effects of these two 
important aspects of political systems on disaster outcomes are not linear but dependent on one 
another. The interaction model explains around 4% more of the variance in the dependent 
variable between countries than does the model where the effects are assumed independent 
(Model 3), as shown by the change in the R2. The negative sign of the interaction coefficient 
implies that the variables decrease each other’s effect on the number of disaster victims when 
the effects are positive and increase each other’s effect when the effects are negative.  
The results are true for the between-country sample, while results from the within-
estimation for the interaction effects are insignificant. This can stem from the fact that the 
variables are rather stable over time. Democracy and quality of government change rather slowly 
and therefore might not necessarily change over the time period of the study. Additionally, once 
infrastructure for disaster response is built, it can remain in place for years, even if political 
changes occur. In such a case the results will not reflect the relationship, which makes it difficult 
to analyze changes over time in our variables in the first place. The analysis of differences 
between countries around the world, however, is based upon historically accumulated 
experiences, which led to the current situation and can offer the basis for an informative 
comparison.  
We proceed by examining the conditional marginal effects of democracy and quality of 
government on the number of people suffering the consequences of natural disasters in greater 
detail by analyzing marginal effects. As the results only seem to explain the relationship between 
the indicators across countries not developments over time within states, we only build graphs 
for the between-sample. Figure 4 depicts the interactive relationship between institutional quality 
and egalitarian democracy in their effects on total number of people affected by natural disasters 
(logged). In the graphs, the vertical axis on the left shows the magnitude of the marginal effect, 
while the vertical axis on the right is for the frequency distribution and indicates the distribution 
of cases in the sample for the variable on the horizontal axis.  
Figure 4a shows that among countries with low institutional quality, scoring below 3 on a 
0 to 10 scale of institutional quality, which is at the level of Bangladesh, in more democratic 
countries, results in a higher number of people affected by natural disasters than in less 
democratic states. The histogram on the graph shows that these countries comprise around 8% 
of our sample. However, when institutional quality reaches the level of 6 on the 0 to 10 scale, 
which is the level of Poland, democracies with higher egalitarian values seem to outperform less 
democratic regimes and democracies where egalitarianism is less developed. More egalitarian 
democracy is associated with fewer people suffering the consequences of disasters the higher the 
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level of institutional quality. The countries above the threshold of 6 on the Quality of 
Government index comprise 22% of the sample. 
 
Figure 4. Conditional marginal effects of egalitarian democracy (a) and quality of 
government (b) on the number of people suffering the consequences of natural disasters 
 
Figure 4b shows that among countries scoring more than 7 on a 0-10 egalitarian 
democracy scale (which is at the level of Hungary) and therefore having high levels of egalitarian 
democracy, countries with higher institutional quality have a lower number of people affected in 
natural disasters than democracies with lower institutional quality, and the effect is stronger in 
countries where egalitarian democracy values are more developed. The histogram overlaying the 
graph specifies that these cases comprise about 18% of the global sample. In countries that score 
below 3, which is the level of Thailand and Iraq (30% of all states) the effect of institutional 
quality on the number of people affected by disasters is surprisingly positive, implying that 
authoritarian states and highly unequal democracies that score higher on institutional quality 
witness more people being affected by hazardous weather events than in countries with lower 
institutional quality. The result implies that higher quality of government does not help to better 
protect populations against natural hazards, if a country is authoritarian and/or highly unequal.  
As a general pattern, democracy and institutional quality are shown to exert 
complementary effects: at low levels of institutional quality, when more democracy is associated 
with more disaster victims, the increase in quality of government mitigates the negative effects of 
democracy13. When institutional quality is high and more democracy is associated with fewer 
																																																						
13 When interpreting these effects, one has to keep in mind what “more democracy” means in the low institutional 
quality contexts. As the political system is corroded with corruption, lack of rule of law and poor-functioning public 
administration, more democracy is likely to mean a step towards elections rather than a step towards inclusiveness 
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disaster victims, a further increase in institutional quality intensifies this relationship, implying 
that countries with higher quality of government and higher levels of democracy significantly 
outperform democracies with lower institutional quality.  
 
Robustness checks 
To check for the robustness of our results we performed our analysis using different dependent 
variables, weighting number of people affected per disaster by the population size and land area. 
To capture dynamic effects, we also tried including lagged dependent variables in the within-part 
of the equation and lagging each independent variable by one year. The results from the 
between-part remain robust, while results in the within-part remain insignificant. We also tried 
adding different geographical control variables, namely land area, latitude and SIDS dummy. 
Additionally, we used the Freedom House/Polity IV democracy indicator that does not account 
for inequalities as an independent variable and included different measures of inequality, such as 
subcomponents of the egalitarian democracy index (v2x_egal from Coppedge et al. (2016a)) or 
GINI index as controls.14 The results remain robust to all these specifications (see Appendix C). 
Conditional marginal effects plots, with the results from the robustness checks, are available 
upon request. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The goal of this paper has been to investigate the interplay between democracy and quality of 
government for countries’ ability to cope with natural disasters. The level of democracy and 
spread of egalitarian values determine equality in political representation and access to political 
power, and therefore, influence the size of the population entitled to receive public goods. At 
the same time, the state’s capacity to implement policies and deliver the results defines how the 
decisions to distribute public goods are implemented and whether they are implemented at all.  
The study compares how the countries around the globe respond to adverse weather 
events and how levels of political equality interact with institutional quality in preventing severe 
consequences from natural disasters for the people. The results support theoretical expectations 
																																																																																																																																																																							
or higher redistribution. The possible explanations to this result are provided further in the discussion section 
referring to the cases of Haiti and China.  
14 We are aware that lack of data for well performing authoritarian regimes on the variables measuring egalitarianism 
and the GINI index variable is a weakness in our models. However, as our theoretical argument, and thus our 
scientific contribution, is based on the importance of egalitarianism for disaster preparedness, we find it essential to 
model inequalities in our analysis.  
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that the effect of democracy on natural disaster outcomes depends on countries’ ability to 
implement tasks and deliver public services. Higher quality of government is associated with 
substantively lower numbers of people affected by natural disasters only in those countries 
where egalitarian democracy is strongly developed. For example, people suffer less in 
democracies with high institutional quality such as Sweden, Iceland or the Netherlands than in 
democratic Slovenia, where institutional quality is lower. Among authoritarian regimes and 
highly unequal democracies, quality of government does not seem to help disaster preparedness. 
The positive effect of democracy on disaster outcomes has similarly been shown to be 
dependent on a country’s institutional quality. More democracy seems to favor disaster 
preparedness only when institutional quality is high, or as our model indicates, has reached a 
level on a par with that of Poland. Strikingly, among countries where institutional quality is low, 
i.e. lower than the level of Bangladesh, more democratic countries seem to suffer more from 
natural disasters than do less democratic states. This finding can be explained by the case study 
evidence from Haiti and China: in both cases, it is probable that poor planning and lack of 
sound building codes in construction is likely to cause widespread damage. However, in myopic 
democratic regimes with low quality of government, administrative inefficiency tends to prevail 
during emergency evacuations and results in higher numbers affected, while autocrats can try 
safeguarding their legitimacy by providing stronger emergency support.  
The findings imply that only countries that experience both high quality of government 
and the egalitarian benefits of democracy have a significantly fewer number of people affected 
by natural disasters than the rest. Neither democracy nor high quality of government taken 
separately seems to be a sufficient condition for disaster preparedness among political sources of 
vulnerability. More democracy can be even more detrimental than less in contexts with pervasive 
corruption, incompetent and inefficient bureaucracies and the lack of rule of law. These findings, 
however, do not imply that democracy is unimportant, but rather that its positive effects should 
be seen as dependent on the capacity of public administration to implement their tasks and 
deliver efficient disaster prevention.   
This paper contributes to the literature on the political economy of disasters and public 
goods provision and offers empirical evidence as to the interconnection between democracy, 
which shapes the decision-making processes and the degree of inclusiveness of the political 
system, and quality of government, which shapes implementation practices in the delivery of 
public goods and services, in disaster preparedness. Given that the number of natural disasters is 
likely to grow in the near future (Parry et al. 2007), understanding disasters as a political problem 
and recognizing institutional factors as political sources of vulnerability can help direct actions 
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aimed at reducing people’s suffering in disasters more efficiently. Future research should explore 
the interactive mechanism of democracy and the quality of public administration in terms of its 
effect on disaster preparedness through case studies, establishing the causal links between these 
factors more firmly. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1. Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis  
Variable Obs 
N of 
countries Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total affected per disaster 1,958 125 300516 1345243 0.25 28900000 
Total affected per disaster (log) 1,958 125 9.23 3.01 -1.39 17.18 
Disaster frequency 1,958 125 3.90 4.54 1 37 
Disaster frequency (log) 1,958 125 0.97 0.82 0 3.61 
Egalitarian Democracy (resc) 1,958 125 4.14 2.47 0.40 9.14 
QoG Index (resc) 1,958 125 5.10 2.08 0.56 10 
GDP per capita 1,958 125 8100.73 9705.41 143.38 55158.41 
GDP per capita(log) 1,958 125 8.30 1.25 4.97 10.92 
Pop.density 1,958 125 112.66 153.32 1.46 1178.50 
Pop.density(log) 1,958 125 3.99 1.31 0.38 7.07 
Population 1,958 125 70279.17 186595.40 7.36 1324353 
Population(log) 1,958 125 9.99 1.44 2 14.10 
 
 
Table A.2. Correlation between variables used in the analysis  
  
Total 
affected per 
disaster (log) 
Dis.freq. 
(log) 
Egal. 
Dem. 
Dem. 
(F.H/P
olity 
IV) 
QoG 
Index 
GDP 
/capit
a (log) 
Pop. 
densit
y (log) Pop.(log) 
Total affected per 
disaster (log) 1.00               
Disaster frequency (log) 0.29 1.00             
Egalitarian Democracy -0.31 0.04 1.00           
Democracy(F.H/Polity 
IV) -0.21 0.07 0.83 1.00         
QoG Index -0.24 0.06 0.68 0.53 1.00       
GDP per capita(log) -0.33 0.09 0.70 0.58 0.71 1.00     
Pop.density(log) 0.09 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 1.00   
Population(log) 0.29 0.63 -0.06 -0.09 0.08 0.08 0.31 1.00 
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Appendix B. Countries included in the analysis 
 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Azerbaijan 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Armenia 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Myanmar 
Belarus 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Sri Lanka 
Chile 
China 
Taiwan 
Colombia 
Congo 
Congo, Democratic Republic 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus (1975-)* 
Czech Republic 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia (-1992) 
Ethiopia (1993-) 
Estonia 
Finland 
France (1963-) 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, North 
Korea, South 
Lebanon 
Latvia 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia (1966-) 
Mali 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Pakistan (1971-) 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Slovakia 
Vietnam 
Slovenia 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Zimbabwe 
Spain 
Sudan (-2011) 
Suriname 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Egypt 
United Kingdom 
Tanzania 
United States 
Burkina Faso 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
 
 
*for the methodology on the divisions of country-years, see Teorell et al. (2016) 
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Appendix C. Robustness checks 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Between-part 
      Egalitarian democracy 0.486** 0.471** 0.413** 0.492** 
  
 
(0.159) (0.157) (0.140) (0.159) 
  Democracy(FH/PolityIV) 
    
0.547*** 0.858** 
     
(0.142) (0.307) 
QoG 0.574** 0.578** 0.531** 0.587** 0.753** 1.078* 
 
(0.212) (0.202) (0.172) (0.198) (0.246) (0.500) 
Egal.Democracy*QoG -0.103*** -0.106*** -0.097*** -0.110*** 
  
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028) 
  Democracy(FH/PolityIV)*
QoG 
    
-0.101*** -0.163** 
     
(0.026) (0.055) 
Egalitarianism (v2x_egal) 
    
-0.135 
 
     
(0.088) 
 GINI-index 
     
0.006 
      
(0.020) 
Within-part             
Egalitarian democracy 0.045 0.045 0.003 0.045 
  
 
(0.095) (0.095) (0.080) (0.095) 
  
Democracy(FH/PolityIV) 
    
-0.040 -0.087 
     
(0.056) (0.089) 
QoG 0.039 0.043 -0.049 0.043 0.053 0.088 
 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.072) (0.074) (0.071) (0.111) 
Egal.Democracy*QoG -0.062 -0.063 -0.104 -0.062 
  
 
(0.090) (0.090) (0.073) (0.090) 
  Democracy(FH/PolityIV)*
QoG 
    
-0.043 -0.089 
     
(0.045) (0.097) 
Egalitarianism (v2x_egal) 
    
0.055 
 
     
(0.094) 
 GINI-index 
     
-0.015 
      
(0.026) 
LDV 
  
0.147*** 
   
   
(0.042) 
   Constant 3.012 16.159*** 9.664*** 11.988*** 10.889*** 6.981* 
 
(2.016) (1.659) (1.597) (2.933) (1.732) (2.999) 
Observations 1,958 1,958 1,442 1,958 1,966 602 
Number of countries 125 125 114 125 126 105 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Model 1. DV: number of people affected per disaster per capita. Model 2. DV: number of people 
affected per disaster per sq.km. Model 3. DV: number of people affected per disaster. LDV included. Model 4. DV: number of people affected per disaster. Land area, a dummy for Small Island 
Developing States and a measure of country’s latitude are added in the list of control variables. Model 5: DV: number of people affected per disaster. Freedom house/Polity is used as a measure of 
democracy instead of Egalitarian democracy index and egalitarian aspect included as control. Model 6:  DV: number of people affected per disaster.  Freedom house/Polity used as a measure of 
democracy instead of Egalitarian democracy index and GINI index included as control. Coefficients on the control variables GDP per capita, population size, population density and frequency of 
disasters per year are excluded from the table. Coefficients on Land area, SIDS dummy and latitude in Model 4 are excluded from the table.   
 
